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Assessing Regulators Fairly:  
Matching Scientific Knowledge 
With Impact Assessments 
 
Abstract 
Retrospective analyses, regulatory performance measures and scorecards 
have been used for assessing the quality of impact assessments. However, 
these methods neglect the actual scientific knowledge available at the 
time of conducting a specific policy appraisal and do not enable to capture 
the extent of diachronic learning related to a specific regulatory reform.   
By focusing on the EU rail liberalisation, the aim of this paper is to 
assess the quality of economic analyses within impact assessments vis-à-
vis the quality of scientific knowledge. The research design is 
straightforward. A review of the economic literature traces the progress in 
the scientific methods for evaluating the economic impact of rail 
liberalisation. By matching such scientific knowledge with the knowledge 
expressed in the practice of impact assessment, the main hypothesis to 
test is whether economic models are fully exploited by policy evaluators. 
The contribution of the paper is two-fold: on the one hand, it enhances the 
methodology for regulatory policy evaluation and, on the other hand, it 
contributes to the literature of the use of scientific knowledge in policy 
making.  
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1 Introduction 
Impact assessment (IA) is a regulatory governance innovation (Black, 
Lodge, and Thatcher 2005) that has spread transnationally (De Francesco 
2013). The attainment of its institutional viability is not straightforward. 
Contrarily to the highly symbolic event of policy adoption (Goodman and 
Steckler 1989), the implementation of IA is complex and goes through 
several phases in which the relationships and relative power positions of 
policy actors vary (De Francesco, Radaelli, and Troeger 2012). Similarly to 
other innovations (Goodman and Steckler 1989; Steckler et al. 1992), IA 
would become institutionalised as regulators comply with the required 
evaluation standards and procedural routines.  
How can one assess the extent of institutionalisation of IA? As an 
instance of evidence-based policymaking, the institutionalisation of IA can 
have two alternative functions (Head 2016). According to the advocates of 
significant commitment to rigorous and scientific evaluation 
methodologies, IAs should be assessed according to the production of (new) 
scientific evidence ensuring the economic efficiency of a policy. A less 
ambitious, but realistic approach is to consider good policymaking based 
on ¶a range of relevant ´EHVWDYDLODEOHµHYLGHQFH· produced by professional 
expertise (Head 2016: 474). 
Based on the latter approach, this paper puts forwards a 
straightforward ´IROORZWKHHYLGHQFHµmethod for retrospectively assessing 
the quality of scientific methods utilised in IAs. It argues that regulators 
and policy evaluators should be assessed according to the utilisation of the 
best available (professional and scientific) evaluation methodology, rather 
than the evidence produced in order to take the best decision.  
There are several modes for retrospectively assessing IAs (see for a 
review of international experience OECD 1999; OECD 2003; Radaelli and 
De Francesco 2007; De Francesco and Radaelli 2007; Radaelli and Fritsch 
2011). Although the 2(&'·VHIIRUW (1999, 2003), there are not yet 
consolidated standards for evaluating the quality of IAs. Governments 
have been able only to evaluate programmes for the quantification of 
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administrative burdens (De Francesco 2013) such as the ´standard cost 
modelµ(Coletti 2013). As a consequence, scholars and consultants have 
attempted to fill this void by proposing several methods for evaluating 
IAs.  
Retrospective analyses of IAs can be classified according to three 
dimensions: function, procedure, and methodological accuracy of IA. 
Impact studies (OECD 1999: 19) or function tests (Harrington and 
Morgenstern 2004: 13-14; Bizer Lechner, and Führ 2010: 33) assess 
whether an IA has influenced the decision making and improved the 
quality of legislation. Conduct studies (OECD 1999: 19) or content tests 
(Bizer, Lechner, and Führ 2010: 33) aim to evaluate the gap between the 
procedural criteria prescribed by IA guidelines and the content of 
regulatory analyses (Hahn et al. 1999, Ellig and McLaughlin 2011). 
Finally, analytical accuracy studies (OECD 1999: 19) or result tests (Bizer 
et al 2010: 33) focus on the quality of the economic predictions and their 
agreement with the actual impact of a new regulation. 
Within the latter group of retrospective analysis, this paper puts 
forward a methodological recommendation to trace the evolution of models 
utilised by economists for assessing the impact of liberalisation, in order to 
identify general patterns of the evaluation practice as represented in the 
IA documents (on the practice of writing government documents cf. 
Freeman and Maybin 2011; Wesselink, Colebatch, and Pearce 2014). The 
proposed method is applied to 16 IAs and policy evaluation studies 
conducted between 2004 and 2017 in relation to the EU rail liberalisation. 
An in-depth analysis of two IAs complements this qualitative assessment.  
Although assessment of the extent of utilization of scientific 
knowledge is not novel in the (regulatory) IA literature (Desmarais and 
Hird [2014] and Costa, Desmarais and Hird [2016] rely on bibliographic 
metrics), this contribution emphasises the level of authority achieved by 
regulators through their IA documents vis-à-vis the scientific knowledge 
available at the time of a regulatory proposal. The long sequence of EU 
railway reform and the number of IAs and evaluation studies produced 
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allows also to capture the extent of diachronic learning reflected in the use 
of (scientific) evidence across several regulatory reform packages 
necessary for the completion of the liberalisation (cf. Torriti 2010 that 
analysed only an individual EU IA on energy liberalisation). 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Situating the 
methodological contribution of this paper, the next section evaluates the 
advantages and disadvantages of the existing models and practices used 
for assessing the quality of IAs. Section 3 provides a brief overview of the 
EU rail liberalisation. While Section 4 ranks and traces the evolution of 
the scientific methods for assessing the impact of rail liberalisation, 
Section 5 assesses whether the available scientific knowledge has been 
translated into IA practice. Section 6 concludes by summarising the main 
empirical findings and proposes policy recommendations and future 
avenues of research. 
2 Modes of evaluating impact assessments 
Because of the difficulty in conducting impact studies on IAs (but see 
(Shapiro 2008; Shapiro and Morrall III 2012), the literature on the 
evaluation of IAs tends to focus on two main types of retrospective 
analysis: conduct studies (scoring WKHH[WHQWRI´FRPSOLDQFHµZLWK,$
guidelines) and accuracy studies (verifying regulatory cost and benefit 
estimates). Both modes of evaluation have methodological advantages and 
disadvantages. 
2.1 Scoring conducts 
Since the first scorecard drawn by Hahn et al. in 1999, ranking the 
conduct of policy appraisers is a common evaluative standard (see Cecot et 
al. 2008; Fritsch et al. 2013 for scorecards applied on EU IAs). Economists 
(Hahn et al. 1999; Hahn and Tetlock 2008; Lee and Kirkpatrick 2006), 
public policy scholars (Adelle, Hertin, and Jordan 2006), think tanks 
(Vibert 2004; Wilkinson et al. 2004), and stakeholders (NNR 2006) rely on 
scorecards to evaluate the state of the art of (regulatory) IA programmes 
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in the United States, the UK, and at the European level. The feature of 
this type of retrospective analysis is to rely on IA guidelines in order 
derive the standard conduct of a regulator. For instance, Hahn et al. 
(1999) relied on the OMB-OIRA guidelines on complying with the E.O. 
12,866.  
Scorecards are composed of a series of Yes/No questions that generate 
simple measures. They can be weighted and aggregated in an overall 
composite indicator. This differentiates scorecards from checklists. The 
latter are usually a set of single measures that are not aggregated. 
IA scorecards are usually developed according to the following 
qualitative dimensions: quantification or monetization of regulatory costs 
and benefits (Vibert 2004, Torriti 2007), the consideration of sustainable 
development (Wilkinson et al. 2004, Adelle, Hertin, and Jordan 2006), and 
the consideration of several options (Renda 2006; Cecot et al. 2008). Since 
the sample of regulation is usually large, scorecards have never been 
applied to a coherent set of regulations related to specific liberalisation 
programme. Accordingly, it is impossible to qualify the extent of 
diachronic learning of the regulatory analyst in a specific regulatory 
reform. Furthermore, the IA scorecard has not been designed with the 
purpose of assessing the extent of gap between the scientific knowledge 
and the knowledge expressed in IAs. This goal is better achieved by the 
evaluation mode that verifies the estimations of regulatory costs and 
benefits. 
2.2 Verifying estimates 
Several scholars have compared ex ante estimates of costs and benefits of 
specific regulations with ex post assessments of regulatory impact. There 
are three sources for discrepancies between predicted and actual impacts. 
The first source of inaccuracy is implicit in the uncertainty over future 
and unpredictable changes of: i) relative prices of cost components, ii) 
technology DQGDIIHFWHGSDUWLHV·DGDSWDWLRQto new regulations, and iii) the 
wider economic conditions. The second source of analytical inaccuracy is 
related to the lack of scientific knowledge on cause-effect relationships. 
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The final VRXUFHRILQDFFXUDF\UHIHUVWR¶XQFHUWDLQWLHVDVVRFLDWHGZLWK
modelling activities, particularly in regard to any assumptions which have 
WREHPDGHE\DQDO\VWV·2(&'While the first and the second 
types of inaccuracy are extremely difficult to lower through an IA, the 
latter source of inaccuracy is what matters in assessing the quality of 
scientific knowledge utilisation and the appropriateness of regulatory 
analysis. In other words, it is important to separate discrepancies arising 
from flawed applications of scientific knowledge and economic models from 
the other sources of inaccuracy.  
Therefore there is a strand of literature that reviewed the estimates 
of regulatory costs and benefits contained in IAs of environmental and 
occupational safety regulation in order to identify patterns of bias. 
Starting from regulatory costs, Hammitt (2000) compared the marginal 
cost of limiting chlorofluorocarbon consumption in the United States with 
retrospective estimates based on realised market prices. He found that the 
quantifications of compliance costs were substantially overestimated. This 
overestimation occurred especially when compliance required innovative 
solutions that were not yet available at the time of the analysis. 
Consequently, the diffusion of  technology reducing compliance costs was 
often difficult to take into account in the analysis. Harrington et al. (2000) 
provided a meta analysis of 28 cases of ex ante cost estimates of regulatory 
agencies and compared them with ex post cost provided by academics or 
independent analysts. Through a qualitative approach (ex ante estimates 
were accurate if they fall in the range of plus or minus 25% of the ex post 
assessment), they concluded that there is an overall overestimation 
tendency and provided useful methodological recommendations for 
estimating regulatory costs. 
Another strand of literature focused on providing more practical 
recommendations on models for estimating costs and benefits. Hammitt 
discussed the advantages and disadvantages of different modes for valuing 
mortality risk (Hammitt 2000b) and contrasted adjusted life years and 
willingness to pay (Hammitt 2002). In a similar vein, Torriti and Löfstedt 
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(2012) reviewed the evaluative practices related to EU IA and called for a 
higher emphasis on risk analysis. They argued for the use of the value of 
statistical life and the price of carbon, and for an integration of 
macroeconomic modelling and scenario analysis. Matthews and Lave 
(2001) estimated occupational safety costs by relying on input-output 
model that allows identifying the direct and indirect economic impacts of 
injuries, as well as to monetise injuries, illnesses, and fatalities. Matthews 
(2001) proposed to assess the quality of retrospective benefit-cost analyses 
conducted by EPA in relation to the Clean Air Act.  
Turning to methodological recommendation concerning economic 
regulation, to the best of my knowledge only one study evaluated the 
quality of IAs concerning EU market liberalisation. Torriti (2010) 
reviewed the European Commission IAs on the third package of 
liberalisation of energy markets. His assessment concerned also the 
quality of quantitative data and macroeconomic impacts. He identified 
several problems in the application of the chosen macroeconomic model. 
He also remarked, more importantly, the methodological flaw of utilising 
macroeconomic modelling in IAs that instead require the estimations to be 
based on individual responses to regulatory change (Torriti 2010: 1076-7). 
In his analysis, however, there is no reference to the best available 
economic knowledge on the impact of liberalisation on productivity and 
efficiency of energy markets. Matching the best of available scientific 
knowledge and methodology with the retrospective analysis of IAs is 
especially important with regard to EU rail liberalisation that has gone 
through several stages of regulatory reform. The next section will focus on 
the principles of the EU rail liberalisation (for an extensive and detailed 
review of EU rail liberalization see Dyrhauge 2013; Finger and Messulam 
2015). 
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3 The EU rail liberalization  
In December 2016, with the adoption of the market pillar of the fourth 
railway package, the EU single and open railway market has been finally 
accomplished. Railway companies operating in one member state can 
operate passenger services everywhere in the EU. Started in 1991, the 
process of market liberalisation has been gradual and based on the 
(XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQ·VVXSSRUW-building strategy, (Knill and Lehmkuhl 
2000; Di Pietrantonio and Pelkmans 2004).  
Indeed, the creation of a single European railway area has been 
achieved through the progressive adoption and implementation of the 
following three principles of economic governance: i) financial separation 
between rail infrastructure managers and providers of rail service; ii) 
transparency of licensing process through the establishment of national 
regulatory agencies and the European railway agency that with the 
implementation of the fourth reform package is now acting as a 
centralized one-shop stop for licences and safety certification of rail 
operators; and iii) interoperability and technical harmonisation of national 
rail systems. 
In particular, vertical separation and the establishment of 
independent regulatory agencies can be considered as the most important 
institutional innovations associated with the EU rail liberalisation (De 
Francesco and Castro 2016). Vertical separation requires that 
infrastructure managers are financially independent from railway 
operators. This economic governance principle has been the first milestone 
of the EU reform. Directive 91/440 requires only the separation of account 
between the management of rail infrastructure and the provision of 
freight and passengers rail services. In order to comply with this 
requirement, some EU member states have chosen a fully institutional 
separation; others have relied on a vertically integrated model where the 
infrastructure manager and the national incumbent rail operator are 
owned by a holding company. An intermediate model (in which the 
infrastructure manager is independent but delegates several functions to 
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the state-owned incumbent) is also feasible. The directive also specifies 
that essential function such as capacity allocation, infrastructure charges 
and licences must be distinct from train operators.  
After establishing vertical separation, the EU has pursued a 
gradual opening to competition and a progressive harmonization of 
technical and safety standards and administrative processes in order to 
increase the interoperability of national rail systems. Focusing on the rail 
freight, the first package of reforms was enacted in 2001 and defined a 
trans-European rail freight network. To achieve a level playing field for 
new entrants, this package required the independence of the national 
authority responsible for the licensing process from the incumbent rail 
operator. It is important to note that the EU railway package does not 
require a politically independent regulatory agency (Nash 2008: 65). In 
2004, the second railway package increased the administrative 
transparency by furthering the specifications of freight railway 
interoperability and common safety standards, and by creating the 
European Railway Agency (ERA). 
The regulatory reform of freight rail paved the way for the third 
reform package, concerning the passenger market. The 2007 package 
established the service quality standard and the certification of train 
drivers operating within the EU, and introduced open access rights for 
international rail passenger services. Since 2010, cross-border rail 
passenger transport has been officially liberalized for all EU countries. 
International railway companies are allowed to pick up national traffic in 
a country and drop the same passengers on a further stop in the same 
country before crossing borders.  
In 2016, the fourth railway package extended open access rights to 
national (passengers) markets and completed the EU railway system. This 
package enhances impartiality between, prevents discrimination of 
railway operators. It also requires mandatory tender procedure for public 
service contracts. The next section shows how these institutional reforms 
and technical harmonisation have been assessed by economists and how 
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different types of economics used for assessing the impact of regulatory 
reform within railway market can be rated. 
4 Rating the scientific knowledge on railway 
liberalisation 
Economists have been analysing the impact of market liberalisation on 
productivity and efficiency gains of railways in developed countries. They 
rely on several indexes in order to make inferences about a firm, a set of 
firms, or an industrial sector (Oum, Waters, and Yu 1999). An assessment 
of the impact of liberalisation on railway productivity or efficiency 
requires isolating the differences in regulatory environments from the 
different sources of performance enhancement, such as organisational 
efficiency, economies of scale, and network characteristics, as well as 
exogenous factors such as technological change (Oum et al. 1999: 10). 
Given the methodological complexity stemming from an industrial sector 
with multiple outputs, economists have tended to focus on technical 
efficiency that is the minimisation of inputs given the level of output. 
Oum et al. (1999) provides an excellent review of the different 
methodologies for measuring productivity within railway sector. These 
methodologies can be rated according to the level of sophistication of 
theoretical assumptions. The following classification captures also the 
evolution of scientific knowledge providing a useful yardstick to assess the 
quality of economic analyses summarised in the (XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQ·V
IAs and evaluation studies.   
4.1 Indexes of productivity and efficiency 
The simplest methodology for assessing productivity and technical 
efficiency relies on indexes that are ratio-type productivity/efficiency and 
does not require any statistical estimation of a production or cost function. 
¶3URGXFWLYLW\FDQEHFRPSDUHGEHWZHHQILUPVDQG/or over time within a 
ILUP·2XPHWDOThese indexes can be classified according to 
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three general categories: partial and total factor productivity and data 
envelopment analysis method (DEA).  
 
4.1.1 Partial factor productivity 
 A measure of partial factor productivity links a specific output to a 
single input factor, e.g., revenue tonne-kilometres per employees. This 
type of productivity measures is easy to compute and has been widely used 
by academics and the industry to compare the railway performance (Nash 
1981). These indicators concern the productivity of labour, fuel and rolling 
stock without taking into account their interdependence. By 
distinguishing operational from financial performance, partial 
productivity indicators assess the impact of liberalisation on rail 
RSHUDWRUV·revenues and costs (Oum et al 1999: 14).  
4.1.2 Total factor productivity 
A total factor productivity measure is a ratio of a total output index, such 
as freight ton-miles and passenger-miles, to a total input index. The total 
iQSXWLQGH[LVHLWKHU¶WKHZHLJKWHGVXPRIWKHJURZWKUDWHVRIWKH
LQGLYLGXDOLQSXWTXDQWLW\LQGLFHV·RUWKHUDWLRRI¶WRWDOH[SHQGLWXUHV
LQFOXGLQJFDSLWDOE\DQDJJUHJDWHLQSXWSULFHLQGH[·2XPHWDO
This index adequately fits the multi-output multi-input production of the 
rail industry. 
There are different procedures for deriving such comprehensive 
indexes. In order to compare firm-level productivity, the methodological 
procedure is to assume that operating environments and economies of 
scale are the same across firms (K. D. Freeman 1985). Decomposition is a 
statistical method for relaxing this assumption, by regressing the total 
RXWSXWLQGH[RQ¶various combinations of variables including route miles, 
DYHUDJHWULSOHQJWKDYHUDJHOHQJWKRIKDXODQGILUPGXPP\YDULDEOH·
(Oum et al 1999: 22). Decomposition has been used by Gathon and 
Pestieau (1995) in the assessment of the European railways by isolating 
managerial efficiency from regulatory components.  
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4.1.3 Data envelopment analysis 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is a method for constructing index of 
efficiency based a non-parametric linear production frontier. It requires 
intensive data collection of each railway company in the sample for each 
year of the observation time period. The DEA index varies between 0 and 
1 and is dependent on the observed best practices in the sample that lie 
along the production frontier (Oum et al 1999: 24). Accordingly, DEA is 
used for benchmarking the productivity of railway firms (for instance 
Bookbinder and Qu [1993] ranked two Canadian and five American 
railway companies). 
This methodology has been used for comparing the productivity 
efficiency in 19 OECD countries (Oum and Yu 1992). Statistical regression 
models can isolate the effects of different operating environments in order 
to quantify the effect of public subsidies and regulatory reform on firm 
efficiency (Oum and Yu 1994).  
 The main problem with DEA is related to its sensitiveness to 
outliers and measurement errors. Furthermore, DEA efficiency indexes 
are sensitive to the selection of inputs and output included in the analysis 
(Oum et al. 1999: 24). These limitations led economists to rely on 
parametric models to estimate a production function of railway operators.  
4.2 Conventional econometric methods: deterministic or stochastic 
production frontier  
Econometric methods estimate a production function and quantify 
changes in productivity or efficiency also taking into account sources and 
levels of inefficiency. The inefficiency term can be assumed to be a 
deterministic or a stochastic value. While firm dummy variables and firm-
specific time trend variables are common methods for deterministic 
frontier models, in stochastic models the inefficiency term is the deviation 
of each firm from the stochastic production frontier (Oum et al 1999: 31). 
Both methods have been used to assess the impact of vertical separation of 
rail network infrastructure from operations on economies of scope in the 
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European railway systems and companies. Gathon and Perelman (1992) 
showed that managerial autonomy from public authority increases the 
technical efficiency of railway companies. Whilst based on a panel data of 
12 European state-owned railways between 1973-1990, Cantos Sanchez 
(2001) supported the argument for vertical integration between 
infrastructure and operations of state-owned companies in order to avoid 
possible inefficiencies.  
Overall, stochastic frontier method has emerged as the methodological 
standard for assessing the impact of the staged EU liberalisation on 
railway efficiency growth (Wetzel 2009). The scientific methodology for 
evaluating the impact of liberalisation of railway has evolved from partial 
and total productivity indexes to DEA-based efficiency indexes, from the 
use of indexes to model estimation of productivity or efficiency changes. 
The next section assesses whether this gradual evolution has been 
followed also in the quality of the scientific knowledge and the methods 
employed in IAs on EU railway liberalisation. 
5 Scientific knowledge and methodological 
sophistication in the IAs on EU railway 
liberalisation 
5.1 Sample of IAs 
Since 2003, the European Commission has been producing IAs on 
regulatory proposals. The Regulatory Scrutiny Board maintains an 
electronic repository of all IAs so far conducted. In such a repository, I 
could identify 11 IAs specifically related to railway (see Table 1).1 An 
additional IA was retrieved from the DG Move websites.2 In this sample, 
there are nine IAs associated with EU railway liberalisation (indicated in 
                                                        
1 I have excluded from the sample IAs concerning the Trans-European Transport 
Network. 
2 https://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/rail/studies/rail_en and 
https://ec.europa.eu/transport/facts-fundings/studies_en 
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bold in Table 1). In the webpages of the DG Move dedicated to evaluation 
studies, I retrieved other seven reports (cf. Table 2).  
Table 1 shows that there is a large variation in the evaluation 
models utilised for assessing the economic impact within IAs. There are 
six IAs that relied on qualitative assessment and multi criteria analysis; 
while only three IAs relied on quantitative evaluation such as dynamic 
model of operation ratio, regression models and financial formula. From 
this population of nine IAs, I have selected two IAs for in-depth content 
analysis. One concerns with the passengers railway reform by selecting 
the 2004 IA on the development of the EU railway (SEC(2004)236), the 
other IA, the 2010 IA on recasting the first package, concerns with the 
reform of freight sector (SEC(2010)1042). These IAs are related to the 
most important liberalisation packages concerning the freight and the 
passengers sector respectively. Although limited, these two IAs are spread 
across time (2004 and 2010) and are representative of two different stages 
of EU rail liberalisation process. The 2004 IA was drafted in relation to 
the 2007 third liberation package; the 2010 IA referred to the 2012 
recasting measures, the necessary intermediate steps to accomplish the 
full liberalisation of the fourth package. Furthermore, these IAs utilise 
two different quantitative indexes and models. 
 
Table 1: IAs on EU rail regulation and liberalisation 
Year Source IA title IA code Economic impact model 
2004 IA 
website 
Directive amending Council 
Directive 91/440/EEC on the 
development of the Community's 
railways 
SEC(2004)236 Dynamic model of operating 
ratio 
2006 IA 
website 
Certification and security in 
railway transport and 
interoperability of the 
Community rail system 
SEC(2006)1641
SEC(2006)1642  
Qualitative multi-criteria 
assessment of several 
options for each measures 
2007 IA 
website 
Communication on rail freight 
oriented network 
SEC(2007)1324 Qualitative assessment of 
feasibility of 4 options 
2007 DG 
Move 
Impact assessment study on rail 
noise abatement measures 
addressing the existing fleet 
  
2008 IA 
website 
Communication on multi-annual 
contracts for rail infrastructure 
quality 
SEC(2008)132 Multi criteria analysis with 
estimations of cost savings 
and other estimated 
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measures of economic 
impact 
2008 IA 
website 
Community guidelines on state 
aid for railway undertakings 
SEC(2008)517 Quantitative financial 
formula for estimating the 
level of indebtedness  
2008 IA 
website 
Proposal for a Regulation 
concerning a European rail 
network for competitive freight 
SEC(2008)3028 Dynamic model using tools 
for transport forecasting 
and scenario testing3 
2010 IA 
website 
Proposal for a Directive 
establishing a single European 
railway area (recast) 
SEC(2010)1042 Regression models 
2013 Register 
of EU 
COM 
Proposal for a Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the 
Council amending Directive 
2012/34/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 
21 November 2012 establishing 
a single European railway area, 
as regards the opening of the 
market for domestic passenger 
transport services by rail and 
the governance of the railway 
infrastructure  
SWD(2013)13 Qualitative assessment of 
the policy options supported 
by quantitative elements 
2013 IA 
website 
Proposal for a Regulation 
establishing the Shift2Rail Joint 
Undertaking 
  
2017 IA 
website 
Proposal for a regulation on rail 
SDVVHQJHUV·ULJKWVand 
obligations (recast) 
SWD(2017)318 Comparison of policy option 
scenarios based on multi 
criteria analysis based on 
UDLOZD\FRPSDQLHV·
predicted costs 
 
Table 2 shows that also the evaluation studies relied on a range of 
methods. This variation is essentially due to the different consultancies 
tendered for the evaluation reports. Overall, these methods both for IAs 
and evaluation studies are different from productivity and efficiency 
indexes and models utilised by economists. 
 
  
                                                        
3 https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/scientific-tool/trants-tools-transport-forecasting-and-scenario-
testing 
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Table 2: Evaluation studies on EU rail regulation and liberalisation 
Year Evaluation title Evaluation method 
2008 Preparatory study for an impact assessment 
for a rail network giving priority to freight 
Micro and macro ² level impacts based on 
changes of quantitative and qualitative 
measures consequent to policy options  
2009 Separation of account of railway 
undertakings and rail infrastructure 
managers 
A study on the extent of compliance with 
the separation of account as required by 
directive 1991/440. Based on operational 
and financial data at railway company 
level 
2010 Evaluation of the implementation of 
Regulation (EC) No 881/2004 of 29 April 
2004 establishing the European Railway 
Agency: Results of the stakeholder analysis 
$VWXG\RQVWDNHKROGHUV·SHUFHSWLRQRIWKH
effectiveness of the ERA in rail 
liberalisation 
2010 Study on Regulatory Options on Further 
Market Opening in Rail Passenger 
Transport 
Regression analyses of the impact of 
market opening on increasing the rail 
modal split 
2011 Evaluation of Regulation 881/2004 
establishing the European Railway Agency 
(ERA) 
Mainly stakeholder consultation and 
interviews ERA management and staff, 
independent analysis  
2012 Further action at European level regarding 
market opening for domestic passenger 
transport by rail and ensuring non-
discriminatory access to rail infrastructure 
and services 
Qualitative assessment of regulatory 
options and quantitative assessment for 
each option of the predicted net present 
value (NPV = change in revenue ² change 
in operating costs) of a standard railway 
company 
2012 Impact assessment support study on the 
revision of the institutional framework of 
the EU railway system, with a special 
consideration to the role of the European 
Railway Agency 
Quantitative measures such as NPV of 
the direct impacts of the different policy 
options͒  
 
 
5.2  qualitative overview of the two   
The 2004 IA is composed of 35 pages. Similarly, the second IA is 38 pages 
long but comes with a 140 pages of appendix. Through a general analysis 
of the scientific evidence contained in the two IAs, I can conclude that the 
above-mentioned IAs cannot stand independently since both of them rely 
on external analyses and studies written by consultancies. Indeed, 
although they estimate the impact of regulatory proposal, they do not 
provide sufficient information on methodology and assumptions and there 
is no reference to scientific and academic literature, but rather on other 
consultancy reports such as the one drafted by OGM titled Developing EU 
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International Rail Passenger Transport: Assessment of the actual and 
potential market for international rail passenger services. 
The 2004 RIA is based on a 165-pages study on the analysis of the 
impact of EU passenger rail liberalisation, drafted by Steer Davies Glaeve 
(2004), a leading UK-based transport consultancy. This report is freely 
available on the Internet. Overall, based on a EU project funded under the 
Framework Programme 4, this consultancy report is clear in its 
methodology and assumptions but provides no scientific or academic 
references.  
The 2010 IA is also based on a consultancy report drafted by Price 
Waterhouse Cooper (PWC). Although cited in the IA with a webpage 
address, the document of the report is not available on the Internet as the 
provided link is not available anymore. In addition to the PWC report, the 
2010 IA cites a 150-pages long study conducted by SDG on the 
implementation of the first rail package (Steer Davies Gleave 2005). 
Furthermore, this 2010 IA widely refers to data contained in another IA 
drafted for the European Commission Communication on railway 
(SEC(2008)3028). This practice of policy appraisers to rely and refer to 
previous documents, consultancy reports and previous IAs creates a 
dispersed web of data and knowledge, rather than consolidating the 
organisational knowledge gained over time. Accordingly, it is impossible 
for a reader of these IA to understand what is the state of the art of 
knowledge and evidence on the impact of an ongoing process of economic 
liberalisation of railway in Europe. 
5  Assessing the scientific knowledge within IAs 
This section is based on my careful reading of the IAs reports. My overall 
assessment is that while the scientific knowledge and the economic 
literature summaries in Section 4 are concerned with efficiency of 
individual railway operators or national railway systems, the two IAs on 
the railway liberalisation packages covered a variety of economic impacts. 
For instance, the 2004 SDG report underlying the first IA compares 
alternative policy scenarios according to the following dimension of 
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welfare improvement: the volumes of passenger-km, the level of service 
provided to passengers, the fares paid by passengers, and the viability of 
the railway undertakings. This methodological approach to analyse a 
range of economic impacts beyond the rail companies is in line with the IA 
guidelines and the standard notion of welfare economics.  
However, it is important to recall here that fostering the 
competitiveness of the rail systems (vis-à-vis other transport systems) and 
the viability of railway companies was the main priority of the EU railway 
reform and any initiative to liberalise utility markets. And next subsection 
shows that when the focus was on the economic impacts on railway 
operators, the methodological approaches utilised by economists are not 
fully utilised in IAs.  
5.1.1 The 2004 IA (SEC(2004)236) 
 The 2004 IA and the underlying consultancy report drafted by SDG 
are IRXQGHGRQWKH´RSHUDWLQJUDWLRµ, i.e., the ratio of the expected 
revenues to expected costs, of railway undertakings. Accordingly, the 
model attempts to estimate the expected revenues and costs. This ratio is 
calculated on a set of assumptions about public service contracts, modes of 
tendering, and other specifications of the economic governance of railway 
(non-discriminatory practices in ticketing and no further regulation on 
rolling stock).  
Forming the overall simulation (dynamic) model of the viability of 
the railway companies, this set of assumptions is necessary for the 
construction of the operating ratio. In order to assess the viability of 
railway operators, the consultancy report and consequently the IAs relied 
on a dynamic simulation model of the likely costs and revenues, profit 
levels and performance targets of railway undertakings. This 
methodological choice is sensible to the complexity to model railway 
XQGHUWDNLQJV·EHKDYLRXUDQGdata reliability. Specifically, the model 
assumes that railway companies monitor the current and the expected 
rates of expenditure and earnings and accordingly are able to react if the 
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ratio of revenue falls below their profit target, by either increasing 
revenues or by reducing costs (Steer Davies Gleave 2004). 
Overall, in order to assess the impact of liberalisation on railway 
FRPSDQLHV· economic performance, economists prefer to rely on indexes of 
productivity or efficiency gains rather than revenue/cost ratio (cf. Section 
4.1.1, revenues and costs are taken into account only through partial 
factor productivity). The underpinning assumptions of the former are less 
sophisticated but SDUVLPRQLRXVDQGUHO\RQUDLOZD\FRPSDQLHV·GDWDWKDW
is available. Instead, revenue/cost index requires extensive data for 
demand-side assumptions, supply-side costs and operational decision 
parameters and preferences. The problem of data collection was 
insurmountable, as it has been acknowledged in the same IA: 
  
The Commission has requested several consultancy firms to assess 
aspects of the railway markets, but it turned out to be difficult, if 
not impossible, to obtain reliable figures on international passenger 
transport by rail, such as number of passengers; pkm; turnover; 
profitability, etc. Railway undertakings are reluctant to provide 
these data by invoking the commercial nature of the information. 
(European Commission 2004: 11) 
 
In order to face this recognised ¶difficulty of the modelling exercise·
(European Commission 2004: 4), the methodological choice was to rely on 
¶>W@KHLPSRUWDQFHRIWKHTXDOLWDWLYHDSSURDFKIRUWKHDVVHVVPHQWZKLFK
consisted mainly of a thorough and extended survey amongst the main 
stakeholders, particularly the present monopolists, reveals a mixed 
support for a proposal for market opening· (European Commission 2004: 
4). A further in-depth case study was commissioned by the European 
Commission to have an overview of the impact of the gradual opening up 
of the market for international passengers. And the selected countries 
were Germany, Hungary, Spain, and Sweden. This is another proof of the 
lack of reliance on the policy evaluation methodologies developed by 
economists.   
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5.1.2 The 2010 IA (SEC(2010)1042) 
The 2010 IA refers to the recast and simplification of previous 
liberalisation measures contained in the first reform package, the 
economic analyses concerned key aspects of EU regulatory reform such as 
accounting separation, measures for avoiding discriminatory treatments 
toward new entrants and the establishment of independent (from railway 
infrastructure manager or undertaking) regulatory agencies for ensuring 
transparency in the economic governance of railway markets. 
In its long appendix, this IA provides a set of impact analyses to 
foresee market development, the viability of railway companies and 
administrative costs resulting from five out of nine liberalisation proposals 
for facilitating market entry and competition. Four measures have been 
previously evaluated in a prior IA, the SEC(2008)3028, concerning a 
European rail network for competitive freight (see Table 1). The IA is 
complemented with a summary of stakeholders consultation conducted in 
order to define the problem, assess the effectiveness of regulatory options, 
and collect data for establishing the baseline scenario.  
The evaluation of policy options associated with each of the five new 
regulatory proposals was qualitative. It combined ´VFRUHVµRIstakeholders 
and an (not specified) ´independent assessmentµ scores through a 
qualitative multi-criteria analysis of implementation effectiveness. 
Accordingly, the selection of options was not based on welfare economics 
and scientific evidence. This was also attested by two resubmissions 
required by Impact Assessment Board that requested further 
improvements in the IA. For instance, the shoot out of the option of 
politically independent regulatory agencies is justified by the statement 
that this option would not increase the independence from market 
incumbents and accordingly the expected impacts would be exactly as the 
option of an agency independent from railway operators. However, 
scientific knowledge has already argued for the positive impact of 
politically independent regulatory agencies on market efficiency (Friebel, 
Ivaldi, and Vibes 2010; Wetzel 2009).  
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The preferred option was then analysed through quantitative 
regression models in order to quantify the economic, social and 
environmental impacts of the entire proposed regulatory reform. The 
regression analysis relied on the predicted change of several subindexes of 
Rail Liberalisation Index (Kirchner 2007) as the main independent 
variables, representing the removal of barriers to entry of new operators. 
Modal share of rail freight, number and market share of non-incumbents 
and operating cost per train/km were considered the dependent variables 
of regression models. The qualitative scores of the extent of effectiveness 
of the proposed measures are used to weight the causal direct link 
between barrier removal and freight rail competitiveness. Finally, a 
sensitivity analysis was conducted to take into account variations in the 
baseline scenario of the modal share of rail in freight transport.  
The model identified also indirect impacts of the change of market 
opening consequent to the new regulatory measures. The results of the 
models are the followings: An increase of competition in the freight rail 
PDUNHWDWWHVWHGE\DQLQFUHDVHRIWKHQHZHQWUDQWVDQGQHZHQWUDQWV·
market share. The IA estimates an increase of recurrent administrative 
costs borne by public authorities (16.23 Million of Euro) and private 
companies (11.89 Million of Euro). The IA estimated a positive social 
impact attesting an increase of one thousand additional workers employed 
in the sector, a positive environmental impact in term of air quality, noise 
emission and energy consumption.  
Overall, the methodological model utilised for assessing the impact 
of recast of the EU freight rail relies heavily on subjective judgments 
about the causal link between barrier removal and competition. 
Furthermore, there is an issue with extraneous variance since the model 
does not control for other possible determinants increasing the level of 
market competitiveness. The choice of the country level of analysis is also 
debatable since economic studies on the impact of regulatory changes 
prefer the firm level, focusing on the operative efficiency. Again there is no 
attempt to utilise any of indexes generally used in the economic literature. 
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Neither is there any justification for the failure to consider the existing 
scientific knowledge.  
Conclusion and avenues for further research  
This paper puts forward the methodological recommendation that the 
knowledge produced in IAs needs to be matched against the scientific 
knowledge and methodology. This comparison allows me to contribute to 
the ongoing discussion on methodological standards of ex post IAs that is 
mainly based on scorecards and economic analyses for verifying the ex 
ante estimations of regulatory costs and benefits. By applying this 
methodological recommendation to EU rail liberalisation, this paper 
present a nuanced evaluation of the practices within evidence based policy 
making. The empirical evidence can be summarised as follows: 
1. While economists and scientific papers rely on productivity and 
economic efficiency and take into account the complexity of 
collecting data of railway companies, the knowledge produced in IAs 
and evaluation studies of EU Commission rely on a vast range of 
evaluation methods rarely used by economists.  
2. There is a remarkable mismatch between science and policy in the 
practices of generating knowledge. The scientific knowledge has 
evolved over time following a progressive pattern: from simple and 
partial ratios of productivity to DEA models, from panel data and 
deterministic model to time-series and cross-sectional applications 
of stochastic models of the production frontier. On the other hand, 
the pattern of the knowledge of IAs is scattered. Each IA (and 
associated consultancy report) tends to reinvent the knowledge on 
the impact of railway liberalisation proposing ad hoc economic 
impact methodology. This is possibly due to the plug and play effect 
of evaluative methods of consultancies that produced evaluation 
and IA studies.  
3. Economists privilege parsimonious models which takes into account 
the availability of data; the two IAs analysed rely on either dynamic 
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models which requires a large set of assumptions and (unavailable) 
data or evaluative methods based on subjective judgements.  
4. No IA summarised the state of the art and the best available 
knowledge of rail liberalisation. Over time, the knowledge produced 
throughout successive IAs is not consolidated. This undermined the 
legibility of IAs and the learning associated with different stage of 
regulatory reform.  
 
Turning to the methodological contribution of this paper, although the 
research design for conducting such an assessment is straightforward, the 
actual development of the research has been far more complex. 
Specifically, the collection of evidence has been made difficult because of 
the absence of practice of communicating and summarising the extent and 
quality of scientific knowledge. Furthermore, there is a tendency of 
contracting out knowledge production and each consultancy puts forwards 
a novel appraisal model and evaluation methodology. The richness of 
empirical findings confirms the soundness of the proposed evaluation 
methodology that assesses the extent of the difference in the practices of 
producing knowledge. The difference in the practices and the lack of use of 
the best available knowledge and evaluative methods are so large that it 
seems appropriate to recommend specific policymaking guidelines on how 
to ensure that scientific knowledge is effectively transferred in the 
practices of IAs.  
 Another methodological contribution regards the unit of analysis. In 
order to assess the quality of IA knowledge and the extent of reliance on 
the best available scientific knowledge, it is essential to analyse a set of 
economic analyses associated with a specific regulatory reform. IAs can be 
barely analysed as a standing alone document. This is because 
liberalisation programme come in different but connected packages, but 
also because IAs are often nested inside one another. This casts a doubt on 
previous researches that scored either a small or large sets of individual 
IAs.  
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The evident methodological limitation of the small sample of IAs 
paves the way for two avenues for future research. The first avenue could 
apply the proposed methodology to other EU liberalisation programme in 
order to generalise the empirical finding of this paper. The second avenue 
concerns the improvement of our understanding of the reasons of the 
barriers to the transfer and/or translation of scientific knowledge to EU 
policymaking and liberalisation programmes. This would require in-depth 
case studies that include interviews and discussions with economists and 
scientists in order to discern the influence of consultations, stakeholder 
interactions, policy-science interfaces, the role of consultancy firms within 
EU policy making and the extent of networked knowledge production.  
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